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Public opinion and political debate on immigration reform have focused 
largely on two things: the impact of immigration on the economic well-being 
of U.S. citizens, and the perception that immigrants are prone to crime.
According to a recent poll by the Pew Research Center, 
only about half (51%) of Americans believe that immi-
grants strengthen the U.S. economically through their 
hard work and talents—down 6 percentage points from 
last year—while a sizable minority (41%), including 
a majority of Republicans (63%), say that immigrants 
impose an economic burden by taking jobs, housing, 
and health care resources.1 Views of the relationship 
between immigration and crime are even more nega-
tive. A Gallup poll in 2007 asking whether immigration 
makes the crime situation in the U.S. better, or worse, 
or carries little effect, found that 58% of respondents 
believed it makes crime worse.2 When business mogul 
and Republican presidential contender Donald Trump, 
in articulating his views on immigration, alleged that 
Mexico is “sending” people to the U.S. “that have lots 
of problems”—“they’re bringing drugs, they’re bringing 
crime”—he was reflecting fears and mistrusts held my 
many Americans.3 Not surprisingly, a poll taken earlier 
this year showed that 73% of Americans want to see 
Congress deal forcefully with the immigration issue by 
passing a comprehensive immigration reform bill.4
It has been almost 30 years since the U.S. insti-
tuted comprehensive immigration legislation. In 1986, 
SUMMARY
• Polls show a clear majority of Americans, concerned over is-
sues such as crime and economic competition, wants to see 
Congress pass a new, comprehensive immigration reform bill.
• This brief examines the effects, both intended and unintended, 
of two previous efforts to deter and regulate unauthorized im-
migration.
• Recent research shows that the Immigration and Reform Act of 
1986, by cutting off access to legal employment for undocu-
mented immigrants, actually increases the probability that some 
people who are not in the country legally will engage in crime.
• And despite heightened efforts to police and deport undocu-
mented immigrants in accordance with Section 287(g) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, studies indicate that any resul-
tant decreases in immigrant populations did nothing to improve 
employment opportunities for low-skilled native residents.
• While past research reveals some of the limitations and un-
intended negative impacts of laws aimed at making the U.S. 
less attractive to unauthorized immigrants, less is known about 
the potential positive impacts of laws aimed at inclusion. Such 
knowledge could help to enlighten future debates over com-
prehensive reform.
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Congress passed the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act (IRCA), 
creating a pathway to legal status for 
previously undocumented immigrants. 
Any non-citizen that could docu-
ment having entered the U.S. prior to 
January 1, 1982, and resided continu-
ously in the country since then, could 
apply for amnesty and permanent 
legal residency until May 4, 1988. 
Non-citizens working in agriculture 
were given a slightly longer amnesty 
period, through November 30, 1988. 
In all, IRCA enabled around 2.7 
million people to gain legal resident 
status. At the same time, however, to 
help stem illegal immigration, IRCA 
made new demands on employers by 
instituting the I-9 verification pro-
cess for new hires, making it illegal 
for firms to knowingly hire or recruit 
unauthorized immigrants. By cutting 
off access to legal employment, IRCA 
sought to discourage immigrants 
that could not meet IRCA’s amnesty 
requirements from staying in the 
U.S., and deter new immigrants from 
entering the county.
Ten years later, in 1996, Congress 
acted again in passing the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). 
A sprawling piece of legislation, 
IIRIRA sought to strengthen bor-
der controls, tighten enforcement 
against immigrant smuggling and 
visa document fraud, establish new 
rules for apprehending, detaining, and 
deporting unauthorized immigrants, 
and buttress the employment restric-
tions enacted under IRCA (e.g., it 
introduced the E-Verify program). 
One important innovation of IIRIRA 
was the addition of Section 287(g) 
to the Immigration and National-
ity Act, which authorized the federal 
government to enter into agreements 
with state and local law enforcement 
agencies, allowing designated officers 
at those agencies to enforce immi-
gration law, under the supervision 
of U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE). Although no 
actions initially resulted from 287(g), 
interest in that provision escalated 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, giving 
rise to enforcement agreements with 
Florida, Alabama, and several counties 
in Southern California, among other 
localities.5
Despite popular demands for 
further action on immigration, recent 
efforts to build on or modify current 
legislation either have stalled (Sen-
ate bill S.744) or come under legal 
dispute (President Obama’s execu-
tive order from November 2014). As 
the nation tries to move forward on 
this issue, it is important to consider 
what lessons have been learned from 
previous reform efforts. In particular, 
have the enforcement policies enacted 
under IRCA and 287(g) succeeded 
in addressing the issues that are most 
on the minds of Americans? Have 
the employment restrictions and 
broadened policing responsibilities 
contributed to preventing crime and 
improving economic opportunities for 
native citizens? 
Current research suggests not—
that U.S. immigration policy, in its 
punitive approach to discouraging 
immigration, has had little impact on 
the economic lot of native workers, 
and has created an environment that 
actually invites certain types of crimi-
nal activity. The remainder of this brief 
will summarize what the research 
indicates, recommend areas for further 
study, and offer guidelines for shaping 
the ongoing discussion of immigra-
tion reform.
A PIVOTAL MOMENT— 
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY AND 
IMMIGRANT EMPLOYMENT 
BEFORE AND AFTER IRCA
The implementation of IRCA offers 
a unique window for studying U.S. 
immigration policy. It provided new 
 1  http://www.people-press.org/2015/06/04/broad-public-
support-for-legal-status-for-undocumented-immigrants/. 
 2  http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic1141175.
files/Waters-Simes.Politics%20of%20Immigration%20
and%20Crime.forthcoming%20chapter.pdf. 
 3  http://www.cbsnews.com/news/election-2016-donald-
trump-defends-calling-mexican-immigrants-rapists/. 
 4  http://fusion.net/story/47906/most-americans-want-
republicans-to-focus-on-immigration-reform/.
 5  To date, over 70 law enforcement agencies have entered 
into 287(g) agreements. 287(g) is now being phased out 
across the country, but there is much to learn from the 
results of past agreements. 
 6  Matthew Freedman, Emily Owens, and Sarah Bohn. 2015. 
“Immigration, Employment Opportunities, and Criminal 
Behavior.”   Available at http://works.bepress.com/mat-
thew_freedman/27.
 7  Demographic and population research shows that im-
migrant neighborhoods tend to have higher poverty rates, 
more residents per housing unit, more people of Mexican 
descent, a higher fraction of adults who speak Spanish at 
home, and a higher fraction of foreign-born residents. In 
Bexar County, nearly half of neighborhood residents in the 
sample identified themselves as being of Mexican descent, 
about 9% of residents were foreign-born, and 6% were 
identified as non-citizens.
 8  Sherrie Kossoudji and Deborah Cobb-Clark, “Coming out of 
the Shadows: Learning about Legal Status and Wages from 
the Legalized Population,” Journal of Labor Economics 20 
(2002): 598-628.
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national standards for immigrant 
employment that differed significantly 
from what existed prior to IRCA’s 
implementation. It therefore gives 
a means for assessing whether such 
employment standards constituted an 
effective policy tool for controlling 
immigration flows and enhancing the 
well-being of American communities.
IRCA, in practice, consisted of 
two primary legalization programs: a 
general program for Legally Autho-
rized Workers (LAW), which granted 
legalization to 1.1 million immigrants 
nationwide, and a program specific to 
seasonal agricultural workers (SAW), 
which legalized an additional 1.6 
million people. Most applications for 
long-term residency were approved, 
including 95.5% of all requests for 
amnesty filed in Bexar County, Texas. 
For University of Pennsylvania profes-
sor Emily Owens and her coauthors, 
Matthew Freedman and Sarah Bohn, 
the heavy flow of immigrants into that 
county made it an ideal choice for 
studying the behavior of immigrants 
before and after IRCA.6 
Immigration and Naturalization 
Service records reveal that nearly 
29,000 people in Bexar County, which 
includes the city of San Antonio 
and is about a two hour drive from 
the Mexican border, applied for and 
received permanent legal status under 
IRCA—about 2.2 times the num-
ber of undocumented immigrants 
estimated by the Census Bureau as 
living in the county in 1986. To better 
understand the relationship between 
immigration and criminal activ-
ity, Owens and her coauthors used 
administrative records from Bexar 
County that detailed every felony 
charge between 1980 and 1994. The 
individual-level data identified both 
the type of crime and the residence of 
the alleged offender. They then relied 
on comprehensive neighborhood 
characteristics to identify Hispan-
ics who were most likely recent 
immigrants, in order to distinguish 
them from the largely U.S.-born or 
legalized Hispanic population of the 
county.7
IRCA unquestionably improved 
the labor market prospects of immi-
grants who applied for and were 
granted amnesty between 1986 and 
1988. Immigrants who chose not to 
apply for amnesty, were rejected, or 
came to the U.S. post-IRCA, found 
fewer economic opportunities avail-
able to them, most likely due to the 
threat of employment sanctions. 
Without amnesty, immigrant wages 
dropped as much as 24%, working 
conditions deteriorated, and job search 
durations rose.8
Such changes to the economic 
prospects of unauthorized immi-
grants were predictable results of the 
employment sanctions in IRCA, but 
they also had clear, unintended con-
sequences on the subsequent criminal 
activity of residents in Bexar County. 
Census data on inmates in prison 
shows that foreign-born individu-
als are less likely than native-born 
citizens to commit crimes overall. And 
before the end of IRCA’s amnesty 
period in 1988, Hispanics and non-
Hispanics committed roughly an equal 
number of crimes annually in the 
county. But the research by Owens, 
Freedman, and Bohn finds evidence 
that U.S. immigration policy estab-
lished by IRCA actually increases the 
probability that some people who are 
not in the country legally will engage 
in crime. When the IRCA amnesty 
expired in 1988, and unauthorized 
immigrants were cut off from legal 
employment opportunities, alleged 
felonies committed by Hispanics 
rose 59% in the next few years [see 
Figure 1]. Limiting job opportunities 
through IRCA increased incidences 
of crime, but in a very specific way. 
Empirically, this rise was heavily con-
centrated in non-violent, felony drug 
offenses and other income generating 
 9  Census block groups were the official measure of neigh-
borhoods used by Owens and her coauthors.
 10  Emilio A. Parrado, “Immigration Enforcement Policies, the 
Economic Recession, and the Size of Local Mexican Immi-
grant Populations,” The Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 641 (2012): 16-37. Avail-
able at ann.sagepub.com/content/641/1/16.short.
 11  Randy Capps, Marc R. Rosenblum, Cristina Rodriguez, and 
Muzaffar Chishti, “Delegation and Divergence: A Study 
of 287(g) State and Local Immigration Enforcement,” 
Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2011. [Note: 
Many more deportations occurred outside of 287(g). For 
instance, the American Community Survey reveals that 
roughly 393,000 immigrant removals took place in 2009.]
 12  Sarah Bohn and Robert Santillano. 2015. “Local Immigra-
tion Enforcement and Local Economies” (Unpublished 
Working Paper, obtained from Bohn). 
 13  Parrado (2012).
 14  Ibid.
 15  Ibid.
 16  http://www.npr.org/2013/11/19/245968601/little-
known-immigration-mandate-keeps-detention-beds-full
 17  http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/08/us/san-francisco-
murder-case-exposes-lapses-in-immigration-enforce-
ment.html?_r=0
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crimes that effectively were substitutes 
for formal employment—crimes like 
prostitution, gambling, fraud, forgery, 
car theft, burglary, robbery, and lar-
ceny. Income generating crime charges 
were actually three times as likely to 
be filed as non-income generating 
crime charges across all Bexar County 
neighborhoods.9
One complicating factor in 
calculating the relationship between 
IRCA and immigrant-specific crime 
is the introduction at this time of new, 
stricter anti-drug policies, as well as 
the possibility that the police may 
have started focusing more attention 
on Hispanics after the expiration of 
IRCA’s amnesty. But the analysis of 
criminal conviction rates by Owens, 
Freedman, and Bohn determined that 
the uptick in felony charges was not 
driven by changes in drug laws or 
policing practices, but rather by the 
new U.S. policy that reduced employ-
ment opportunities for immigrants 
without legal status. Not only was 
the rise in income generating crimi-
nal activity non-trivial, but tellingly, 
the change in the crime rate among 
immigrants was in line with other 
economically high-risk groups, like 
native residents living below the pov-
erty line.
287(G)’S INABILITY TO CURB 
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND 
AFFECT THE SUPPLY OF 
NATIVE JOBS
Just as IRCA provided a turning point 
for evaluating the state of immigrant 
life and the broad effects of reform, 
so too do two key occurrences from 
the end of the last decade allow for 
a better understanding of immigra-
tion’s effects on native residents: the 
economic crisis and the adoption of 
287(g) agreements across the country.
A common motivation for stricter 
immigration enforcement policies, 
whether law enforcement partnership 
agreements like 287(g) or enhanced 
border security, stems from a preva-
lent, public belief that restricting 
the inflow of immigrants, especially 
those unauthorized to live and work 
in the U.S., will increase employment 
opportunities for low-skilled, native 
residents who are looking for work. 
But there are two issues with this 
belief. First, it is not clear that policy 
actions, even if desirable, actually have 
the ability to affect population move-
ments, as the decision to emigrate is 
based largely on economic consid-
erations. A second and related point 
is this: in the face of an economic 
downturn, immigration becomes a less 
attractive proposition and the supply 
of immigrants decreases naturally.10 
The fact remains, however, that 
287(g) did have some effect on local 
foreign-born populations. By 2011, 
the program had identified about 
186,000 immigrants for deportation 
and around 126,000 left the country 
voluntarily.11 Therefore, understanding 
the extent to which 287(g) impacted 
the size of these populations and 
increased native employment and 
wages, if at all, may be instrumental in 
informing and shaping immigration 
enforcement policies in the future.
New research conducted by Sarah 
Bohn and Rob Santillano looks at the 
local economic impact of immigrant 
removal through 287(g) by comparing 
counties that participated in a 287(g) 
agreement versus neighboring coun-
ties that did not.12 Using data from 
Quarterly Census of Employment 
and Wages reports, the Department of 
Homeland Security, and the National 
Conference of State Legislatures, 
Bohn and Santillano utilized what is 
known as a difference-in-difference 
approach—similar to what the 
FIGURE 1: AVERAGE ANNUAL NEIGHBORHOOD CRIMINAL INCIDENCE BY 
ETHNICITY
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researchers studying IRCA used—in 
order to control for time-varying 
local economic shocks. This approach 
isolates the economic consequences of 
implementing 287(g) and provides a 
clearer assessment of 287(g)’s effects 
on employment and wages than, for 
instance, comparing 287(g) localities 
with non-participating localities in 
different regions of the country based 
on population alone.  These research-
ers found that compared to neighbor-
ing counties, wages in counties with 
287(g) agreements did not uniformly 
rise. In fact, wages in these localities 
were lower in administrative services 
(e.g., janitorial work) and slightly 
lower in construction, although not in 
other immigrant-heavy industries like 
manufacturing or accommodation and 
food services. 
Additional findings, looking 
specifically at immigration from 
Mexico, confirm that 287(g) did not 
have a substantial impact on aggregate 
economic activity, and that there is no 
evidence that the program improved 
employment opportunities for native, 
low-skilled residents or helped to 
protect them from the negative effects 
of the recession.13 Tellingly, there is 
no indication of correlation between 
changes in local foreign-born Mexican 
populations and jobs in an industry 
that was hit especially hard dur-
ing the recession and that employed 
many workers, undocumented and 
native alike: construction [see Fig-
ure 2]. The implication here is that 
native and foreign-born workers are 
likely complements, not competitors, 
because each group fills specialized 
needs in respective industries. 
Ultimately, 287(g) was effective at 
removing unauthorized immigrants 
only when applied forcefully, and in 
some cases, enforcement measures 
led to media and federal government 
inquiries about alleged civil rights 
violations and misappropriations of 
law enforcement resources. Among 
287(g) participating localities, the 
largest reductions in foreign-born 
populations were seen in Dallas, Los 
Angeles, Riverside, and Phoenix. 
Aside from these four, no other 287(g) 
participating locality removed more 
unauthorized immigrants between 
2007 and 2009 than any one of several 
so-called “sanctuary cities,” includ-
ing New York, Chicago, Denver, and 
San Francisco, which did not (by 
definition) participate in 287(g). On 
a national level, 287(g) had little to 
no ability to control the outflow of 
undocumented immigrants. The reces-
sion, on the other hand, proved quite 
effective at reversing the growth trend 
of immigration into the United States. 
Yet even the observed decreases in 
foreign-born Mexican immigrants did 
nothing to improve the employment 
opportunities for low-skilled native 
residents.14
POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS 
AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH
As Emily Owens has noted, while it 
is not clear that policies like height-
ened policing or employer sanc-
tions are effective at all in reducing 
immigration, it is also unknown how 
much loosening those restrictions 
would increase immigration. The less 
responsive immigration flows are to 
U.S. policy, the more policymakers 
should consider trying to reduce the 
FIGURE 2: LACK OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN UNDOCUMENTED MEXICAN 
WORKERS AND CONSTRUCTION JOBS, 2007-2009
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negative social effects associated with 
undocumented immigrants directly, 
rather than waging a seemingly futile 
battle to reduce the number of people 
overstaying their visas or entering the 
country illegally.
Given the lack of observed 
economic benefits to native residents 
from “attrition through enforcement” 
policies, and their clear ineffective-
ness at achieving desired immigration 
flows, even when applied rigorously 
for a sustained period of time, it is 
probably unwise that policymak-
ers have trended in this direction, 
as evident in recent state laws like 
Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and Alabama’s 
H.B. 56, as well as the federally initi-
ated Secure Communities program of 
2008, which is a deportation program 
similar to 287(g). Part of this push 
for stricter enforcement and deporta-
tion has involved a renewed call to 
eliminate “sanctuary cities” and other 
areas that do not actively seek to 
identify and remove undocumented 
immigrants. However, the revitalized 
neighborhoods and small businesses 
formed and aided by immigrants 
have led many local governments in 
the country to resist such calls. Some 
states (i.e., Illinois, Massachusetts, 
and New York) have even attempted, 
unsuccessfully, to withdraw from the 
Secure Communities program.15 
These disagreements between different 
regions of the country illustrate just 
how divided government officials are 
in their understanding of the eco-
nomic impact of immigration.
Another example of an “attrition 
through enforcement” program of 
questionable merit is the so-called 
“detention bed mandate.” In late 2013, 
NPR reported on a Congressional 
mandate issued to ICE that required 
the agency to fill “34,000 beds in some 
250 facilities across the country, per 
day, with immigrant detainees.”16 
This program began in 2009 and costs 
taxpayers an estimated $2 billion 
annually. Immigrants in these facilities 
can be made to stay for as little as one 
day or for as long as a few years, again 
beckoning questions about potential 
civil rights violations. But in short, 
the practice of enforcing an arbitrary 
inmate quota likely has an insig-
nificant effect, given the results noted 
above, on decreasing crime or improv-
ing native employment.
Moving forward, as the immigra-
tion debate continues, one of the chief 
roadblocks in studying illegal immi-
gration will be the continued decen-
tralized nature of social data collec-
tion in the U.S., especially compared 
to Europe, and particularly when it 
comes to criminal justice issues. This 
fact was on clear display recently in 
the case of the undocumented immi-
grant with prior criminal convictions 
who shot and killed a woman in San 
Francisco.17 In the U.S., the best 
research is on tightening immigra-
tion reforms, but there is less research 
being done on how efforts to actively 
incorporate undocumented immi-
grants into society (e.g., sanctuary 
city ordinances, local IDs and drivers 
licenses, and in-state school tuition for 
child arrivals) affect criminal behavior 
and economic outcomes for natives, 
such as wages and employment. In 
other words, while past research has 
revealed insights about the poten-
tial unintended negative impacts of 
laws aimed at making the U.S. a less 
attractive place to live, less is known 
about the potential unintended posi-
tive impacts of laws aimed at inclu-
sion. This knowledge could help to 
enlighten future debates over compre-
hensive reform.
CONCLUSION
Perceptions of how illegal immigra-
tion affects native residents have 
shaped policies, but these policies are 
potentially ineffective both in general 
(i.e., at stopping the tide of undocu-
mented immigrants from entering the 
country, as well as at deporting them) 
and in their specific focuses, like in 
lowering crime and improving native 
employment. Policymakers should 
consider objectively the effects of past 
policies such as IRCA and 287(g), 
before instituting new, non-data 
driven mandates and legislation in 
response to public demand.
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